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Supply chain networks of independent firms collaborating to 
serve a final market are becoming a normal business 
phenomenon. Yet at present it is not clear if and how such 
networks can achieve stability. Nor is it obvious what successful 
managerial guidelines might be for individual companies 
operating in such networks regarding collaboration with the 
other firms involved. This exploratory study investigates these 
questions using a generic simulation model of 100 actors 
distributed over three supply echelons. The model was 
developed in a system dynamics simulation environment using 
design principles from agent-based modeling. In this model, 
each actor holds mental models of the performance of the other 
actors he is interacting with. Preferences for doing business 
with these other agents are driven by this performance. Agents 
differ in the degree in which they value long-term relationships 
over short-term performance. 
Model analysis shows that stability in this complex network 
emerges spontaneously as relative preferences become fixed 
over time. This lock-in occurs fairly early in the simulation 
during a period of considerable stress in the various supply 
chain echelons. Overall, those agents that base their relative 
preferences primarily on the short-term performance of their 
counterparts fare somewhat better than agents focussing on the 
nature of their long-term relationships.  
A real-world example of a supply network exhibiting 
characteristics such as the ones observed in the model is 
presented. Methodological considerations, model limitations 
and tentative managerial guidelines are discussed. 
 
1. Introduction 
In many of today’s turbulent business environments one 
can witness the emergence of collaborative webs of 
independent companies. This is also the case in the 
manufacturing sector, where these webs take the shape of 
networks of interdependent supply agents []1-7. Often, 
these networks are very successful, or at least as 
successful as their vertically integrated counterparts.   
Theoretically, this causes an anomaly. We know from 
transaction cost [8,9] that vertically integrated firms will 
in general be able to achieve lower internal transaction 
cost through better exchange of information, accelerated 
learning, greater ease of doing business and the like. But if 
coordination between these independent supply agents 
takes place via the ever-changing marketplace, then how 
can these networks achieve the stability over time that is 
required for such learning and accommodation? And what 
kind of policies should management of individual firms 
operating in these networks have regarding collaboration? 
Should they still be purely market-driven or put priority 
on the business interests of their network partners? 
This study attempts to find exploratory answers to these 
questions by simulating a considerable number of such 
supply networks all interacting with each other. Its 
theoretical backgrounds are diverse and are discussed in 
the next section. Section 3 describes the model that was 
used for this study, Section 4 presents the main findings 
from model analysis. To strengthen the external validity of 
this study’s findings, an empirical example is presented of 
a supply network in the high-tech electronics industry that 
exhibits many of the characteristics found in the behavior 
of the simulation model. This case is presented in Section 
5. Reflections of methodological, theoretical and 
managerial nature are discussed in Section 6. The main 
points from this article are restated in Section 7. 
2. Theoretical backgrounds 
2.1. Decentralized Supply Chain Networks 
The advent of the network economy [1] is triggering 
profound changes in the scope and impact of supply chain 
management. In the network economy, the vertically 
integrated business firm may become the exception and 
ever changing networks of organizations the rule [3,7,10. 
For many decades, the relevant perspective to maintain in 
managing a business has been that of the individual firm. 
This has also been the case in supply chain management 
(c.f. [11]). But recently, the attention in supply chain 
management has shifted towards inter-firm networks, 
where the relevant perspective in thinking about supply 
chain management is at the level of a network of 
independent actors (c.f. [4]). At present, there is 
considerable unclarity about how these interorganizational 
networks should be coordinated.  
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Mainstream OR/MS 
For a long time, the field of operations 
research/management science (OR/MS) has considered 
decentralized supply chains as an undesirable real-world 
aberration, rather than a successful business model.  This 
is because mathematical analysis will show that such 
supply chains, where the constituent actors will strive to 
optimize their local performance, will have a performance 
which is sub-optimal to, or at best no better than, an 
integrated supply chain that is managed from one central 
position (c.f. [12,13]). 
However, recently several articles are appearing in 
leading journals that investigate optimal policies for 
management of decentralized supply chains, perhaps 
partly because of the success of such chains in the real 
world (e.g. 6,14-17]). 
2.3. System Dynamics Supply Chain Modeling 
One promising method to investigate interorganizational 
supply chains through formal modeling is system 
dynamics. System dynamics can take credit for being the 
first branch of mathematical research that has investigated 
management policies for decentralized supply chains. 
Forrester’s Industrial Dynamics from 1961 [18] and the 
famous ‘’Beer Game’’ [19] that was developed on the 
basis of this work have for decades been dominant in our 
understanding of amplification effects in supply chains. 
Meadows’s work on the ‘’hog cycle’’ has extended these 
insights into the business cycle at large [20]. Additions to 
this body of knowledge have continued [22,23], but the 
main thrust of this research has been taken over by OM 
and Management Science researchers such as Hau Lee et 
al. and their analysis of the so-called ‘’Bullwhip effect’’ 
([6,21].  
Methodologically, system dynamics has always placed 
a strong emphasis on the notion of counter-intuitive 
behavior of complex dynamics systems. That is, due to the 
intricate interplay between many interrelated factors and 
the non-linearity of their relationships, the dynamic 
behavior of complex systems is becomes practically very 
difficult to predict from a description of their static 
structure. Hence, simulation modeling and analysis is 
essential for robust policy design [18,24]. 
2.4. Agent-Based Modeling 
Agent-based modeling is a simulation methodology that 
employs an implicit world-view [25] that is very close to 
the perspective of a network of interdependent actors. In 
agent-based modeling, large numbers of actors are 
simulated that adapt their behavior in response to changes 
in their environment. Often, the basic assumptions about 
this behavior are relatively straightforward. However, as 
Axelrod, one of the leaders in this field, points out:   
“Although the assumptions may be simple, the 
consequences may not at all be obvious. The large-scale 
effects of locally interacting agents are called ‘emergent 
properties’ of the system. Emergent properties are often 
surprising because it can be hard to anticipate the full 
consequences of even simple forms of interaction.” ([26], 
p.4).  
Agent-based modeling is one of the preferred methods 
of analysis for complexity research, where complex 
adaptive systems are being investigated. According to one 
author, a complex adaptive system is a system “…in 
which complex behavior of the system as a whole emerges 
from the interaction of large numbers of simple 
components, and in which the system is able to adapt - 
that is, to automatically improve its performance 
(according to some measure) over time in response to 
what has been encountered previously” [27, p.1].   
Complex systems are adaptive in that they actively seek to 
make the best out of whatever happens.  In being adaptive, 
complex systems show evolutionary behavior.  
In this area of complexity science, insight has been 
gained on the mechanics of complex adaptive systems. 
Anderson [28] summarizes the key elements of complex 
adaptive systems as made out of agents with internal 
schemata, as self-organizing networks sustained by 
importing energy, as displaying co-evolution to the edge 
of chaos and as showing recombination and system 
evolution effects.  
Holland [29] has described three major components of 
the agents in complex adaptive systems: (1) a performance 
system, (2) credit assignment and (3) rule discovery.  
1.  A performance system denotes the capabilities of 
agents at a point in time without attention for change by 
adaptation in order for agents to react (i.e. the reaction 
ability).  
2. Credit assignment denotes the usage of failure or 
success to assign credit to parts of the performance system 
in order for agents to adapt (i.e. the adaptation ability).  
3.  Rule discovery denotes the changes made to the 
capabilities of agents replacing low credit parts of the 
performance system with new options in order for agents 
to evolve (i.e. the ability to evolve).  
This framework can be viewed as a hierarchy, where 
each component adds a level of sophistication to and 
hence possibilities for emergent behavior in complex 
adaptive systems.  
Specialized languages are available for agent-based 
modeling such as Starlogo [30], ECHO [31] and SWARM 
[32]. Nevertheless, several of the leading researchers in 
this field use general-purpose languages such as C or 
PASCAL (c.f. [26]) because of their personal familiarity 
with them, the experimental nature of the specialized 
packages and the inherent flexibility of general-purpose 
simulation languages. In the present research, a powerful 
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choice was made partly because of the first two reasons 
mentioned above. However, most important was the fact 
that the supply agents to be represented were fairly 
complex in their ordering and production behavior and 
well-tested and documented generic simulation models of 
such supply agents are system dynamics textbook theory 
(e.g. 34, 24]). 
 
3. The Model  
The simulation model that was developed for the research 
reported here is a generic model of multiple convergent 
supply networks, all delivering the same kind of end 
product. The Supply Bill of Material (BoM) of this 
product is as follows, as can be seen from Figure 1. One 
subassembly of each type A, B and C is assembled into 
the final product. A is assembled from component types  
A1 and A2, B from components types B1 and B2, C from 
C1 and C2.  
These product types are produced by hundred independent 
agents, or Actors as they are called in the model. There 
are ten original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) selling 
the final product, three times ten 1
st tier manufacturers of 
A, B and C, respectively and six times ten 2
nd tier 
manufacturers who deliver components A1, A2, B1, B2, 
C1 and C2. The final actor is the end market for these 
products.  
Each actor can receive materials from every actor from 
the tier below it. In this way, ten markets are created for 
each of the (intermediate) products identified. Needless to 
say, the potential number of resulting supply networks is 
huge: each of 10 ten OEMs can receive its materials from 
1000 (10 A’sx10 B’sx10 C’s) combinations of its 1
st tier 
suppliers. Each of these 1
st tiers can receive goods from 
100 combinations of its 20 2
nd tier suppliers.  
Nevertheless, the internal behavior of each of the actors 
is straightforward. Each time period every actor decides 
(1) how much of its final product it wants to ship, (2) how 
much it will produce the coming period and (3) how much 
material it needs to order. In order to make these 
decisions, every actor has a mental model of the expected 
future market demand (based on exponential smoothing of 
recent customer orders) and information on current 
internal levels of final stock, work in progress (WIP), 
materials inventory and production capacity. Given 
certain targets of safety stock, the above-mentioned rates 
can be calculated. This part of the model is highly generic 
and goes back to classic system dynamics models of 
supply chains like Forrester [18] and Lyneis [34]. The 
version used in this research is adapted from a textbook 
model by John Sterman of MIT [24].  
 
What makes this model complex and suitable for 














































10 Suppliers  of A
10 Suppliers  of B
10 Suppliers  of C
10 OEMs
1 END MARKET
10  Suppliers  of A2
10  Suppliers  of A1 10  Suppliers  of C2
10  Suppliers  of C1
10 Suppliers  of B1 10 Suppliers  of B2
Figure 1: Structure of Supply Bill of Material and
 Market Segmentation for the Model
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interacting with, that these models are based upon the past 
behavior of those actors and that every actor adapts its 
own behavior on the basis of these mental models. On the 
basis of these models, actors decide how to allocate 
shipments to customers and orders to suppliers. Every 
actor has a mental appraisal of both the long-term and the 
short-term performance of each of its suppliers (this is for 
the 1
st tier actors upward in the chain) and each of its 
customers (for the 1
st tier actors downward in the chain). 
Both long-term (LT) and short-term (ST) performance 
influence the relative preference of each actor for its 
suppliers and/or customers. The only thing in which the 
ten actors in each of the ten market segments differ is the 
degree in which they emphasize the short-term or the 
long-term performance of their counterparts in 
determining their relative preferences for them. Every 
group of actors has three actors that emphasize long-term 
relationships three actors that emphasize short-term 
relationships and three actors that strike a balance 
between these two. As is shown in Table 2, this means 
that the ST actors let their preferences for shipments and 
orders be determined for 75% by the recent performance 
of their counterparts and for 25% by their history of doing 
business with them, i.e. the cumulative orders placed or 
shipments delivered. The LT actors act just the other way 
round. For them, long-term relationships with counterparts 
weigh for 75% and their recent performance  only for 
25%. Three actors use equal weights for both short-term 
performance and long-term business relation. The tenth 
and final actor relies for 100% on short-term performance 
of his suppliers and/or customers in determining his 
preference adjustments.  
Figure 2 shows a causal loop diagram [24] of how these 
relative preferences reinforce each other. The more a 
customer orders with a supplier, the higher the supplier’s 
preference for this customer will become over time, and 
hence his allocation of shipments to the customer. The 
more shipments a customer receives, the more he will start 
to appreciate this supplier. Please bear in mind though 
that, in periods where the overall level of customer orders 
is not in line with the production rates, delivery delays 
will differ from normal lead times.  
 
 
Although it is not apparent how this will play out at the 
level of individual actors, this will then affect individual 
customer preferences and hence future order rates.  
 
Table 1: Value Distribution for Emphasis on Long-
Term versus Short-Term Performance  




1 0.75  0.75 
2 0.50  0.75 
3 0.25  0.75 
4 0.75  0.50 
5 0.50  0.50 
6 0.25  0.50 
7 0.75  0.25 
8 0.50  0.25 
9 0.25  0.25 
10 0.00 0.00 
4. Model Analysis 
The model is simulated for nine years or 450 weeks of 
network development, in which three three-year business 
cycles for the final product are completed. When we 
investigate the model’s output superficially, we notice the 
infamous Bullwhip effect, as shown in Figure 3 for the 
final product, demand for A and for A1. Final demand for 
the OEMs already contains 40% exogenous demand 
fluctuation. But fluctuations in demand and hence in 
production rates and inventory levels are much greater for 
the 2
nd tier-suppliers than they are for the 1
st tier suppliers, 
and their production and inventory levels fluctuate again 
more than the 40% amplitude of the 3-year business cycle 
that the OEMs are confronted with. But then this was only 
to be expected of a multi-echelon supply chain model (See 
















Figure 3: Amplification of Customer Demand in the 
Three-Echelon Supply Chain 
Further in-depth analysis of the model behavior 
identifies two key characteristics of this model’s behavior 
that are highly relevant to the research question for this 
article. Firstly, that despite the independent nature of the 
agents,  soon very stable supply networks emerge, i.e. 
networks in which relative preferences for specific 
suppliers and customers remain fairly constant. And 
secondly, that an orientation that is tilted towards recent 
performance does result just as well in long-term stable 
relationships with these actors. Moreover, the actors that 
are oriented towards short-term performance of others 
outperform the actors with a long-term focus as well as 
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The remainder of this section discusses these two main 
findings more in detail. 
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Figure 4: Development of Selected Preferences over 
Time 
4.1.1 Preferences are Formed During Period of Severe 
Stress on the Supply Network 
Initially, all actors start with equal preferences for each 
other. This means that, as long as there are no differences 
in short-term performance such as lead time or order 
volume, preferences will continue to be indifferent for all 
actors. However, during the slump of the first business 
cycle in weeks 100-125, as customer demand becomes 
less and less, preferences start to differ amongst the 1
st tier 
suppliers. Those actors that are focused more on short-
term performance will start supplying differently from 
those actors that remain focused on their long-term 
relationships.  This is visualized in Figure 4 for selected 
preferences of customers for and suppliers of subassembly 
A: Actor 1 is short-term oriented, Actor 9 has a long-term 
bias. 
It is too easy to say that the ST-customers will become 
more attracted to the ST-suppliers and that the LT-
suppliers will remain initially remain loyal to the LT-
customers and vice versa. This is certainly what happens 
initially, but then far more complex interactions start to 
occur and the result is somewhat different for every 
market. For 2
nd tier suppliers this moment of 
differentiation starts sooner, already during the first peak 
in Year 2 of the simulation. This is understandable, since 
the Bullwhip effect is creating considerable stress on this 
echelon as early as that. In all instances, it is under severe 
stress that preferences are first differentiated in this supply 
network. 
4.1.2 Relative Preferences Become Firmly Fixed Over 
Time 
It is important to note that, after the 125 week mark, 
preferences continue to become more outspoken but their 
relative ranking stays mostly fixed for the remaining 7.5 
years. In other words, lock-in [35,36]  has occurred. This 
is true for both suppliers and customers. Customers on the 
whole have less volatile preferences than suppliers do and 
actors with a long-term orientation are understandably less 
likely to change their preferences than those with a short-
term orientation, but overall the relative rankings remain 
unchanged. 















Figure 5: Changes in Relative Preferences after an 
Early and a Late Supplier Calamity 
This lock-in becomes all the more apparent from a 
simple experiment. Suppose that, through some kind of 
calamity, one 1
st tier supplier loses all its stock and WIP 
in a single week. If this happens in the first year of the 
simulation, then the long-term customer preferences for 
that supplier are very different from the base case. But if 
the same calamity happens half-way the simulation, after 
five years, then customer preferences for this supplier 
remain virtually unchanged. This is visualized in Figure 5, 
which shows the relative preferences after nine years of 
the 10 OEMs for Supplier 1 of material A in the base 
case, after a major calamity at week 50 and after a major 
calamity in week 250, respectively.  Please note that there 
are hardly any differences between preferences in the base 
case and the situation with a calamity as late as week 250. 
But if we look at the scores for the early calamity, we see 
that only the preferences of customers 4 and 5 have 
remained stable: Our unfortunate supplier has become 
slightly less popular with customers 1 and 6 to 10, but 
considerably more popular with OEMs 2 and 3. Ironically, 
the net result of this change in preferences due to a total 
loss of stock and WIP (and hence, the ability to ship) in 
Year 1 leads to a net increase in Actor 1’s cumulative 
shipments of 21% after nine years, compared to the base 
case.  This is because of its strongly increased popularity 
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this market segment. 
Another interesting phenomenon is that, with a 
complete reversal of management policy from short-term 
to long-term and vice versa, the other nine agents simply 
more or less persist in their old order and shipment 
allocations and hence preferences remain unchanged 
throughout. Apparently, a Nash equilibrium [26] has been 
reached for the other nine agents by this time, in which it 
is no longer advantageous for any of the players to change 
their current preferences. 
4.1.3 Preferences Are Subject to Path-Dependency 
Effects 
The model described here is fully deterministic. It yields 
the same results every time it is run. And yet no two 
market segments display identical behaviors. Overall, 
although some common modes of behavior can be 
observed, as we will see below, the market for e.g. A1 is 
not equal to the markets for A2 or B1. In both echelons, 
the distribution of preferences is different although the 
relative distribution of preferences and priorities is the 
same as are all the initial inventory levels, production 
rates and the like. Apparently, very small changes in order 
levels early on are exacerbated over the course of the 
simulation period. This is again, just like lock-in, a 
phenomenon typical for complex adaptive systems, which 
has been nicknamed the ‘’butterfly-effect’’ by some: the 
idea that the flapping of some butterfly’s wings in China 
can change the weather in the e.g. the Caribbean some 
weeks later [37].  The somewhat less evocative academic 
term is path-dependency [35-37].  
 
4.2. Short-Term Orientation Not Considered 
Harmful 
Overall, agents stressing the short-term performance of 
their business partners in determining their relative 
preferences for them do better, in terms of cumulative 
shipments and material secured, than those agents that 
emphasize the long-term relationship they are having with 
their partners.  Moreover, short-term agents are just as 
stable network partners as are their LT-counterparts.   
Actors in the model that operate both as supplier and 
customer can have a successful short-term orientation in 
one role even though they are operating from a long- or 
medium-term perspective in their other role.  
 
4.2.1. Short-Term Agents Are Stable Network 
Partners 
It seems reasonable to state that supply networks need 
some degree of stability in their constituent links. Through 
stability over time, transaction costs [8,9] can be lowered 
because of mutual learning, easier communication and 
other forms of coevolving [7] or coevolution [38]. 
Therefore, one would expect that a long-term view were 
required from the constituent partners of such a network. 
Equally, one would expect that actors with a short-term 
orientation would keep shifting preferences in their 




































Relative Preferences of Supplier A Actor 1 over Time
Relative Preferences of Supplier A Actor 9 over Time
 
Figure 6: Relative Preferences Stay Fairly Fixed After 
Lock-in Sets In 
Although, in our model, actors with a short-term 
orientation keep evaluating their preferences and 
commitments for their business partners, the net result is 
that the ranking of these preferences remains relatively 
stable over time. Figure 6 shows the development over 
time of the relative preferences for two agents from the 
Supplier A group, Actor 1, with a clear long-term 
orientation, and Actor 9, with a strong short-term 
orientation. What the reader will notice is that relative 
rankings stay fairly stable. In most cases, the absolute 
differences are increased: preferred customers become 
more preferred as time goes by, and vice versa. This is not 
true in particular for Actor 9’s preference for Actor 2, 
which is very high after five years but drops back 
somewhat after nine years. However, Customer 2 remains 
the first choice for Actor 9 throughout this period. So, 
although individual preferences do continue to fluctuate 
and whilst those fluctuations over time tend to be higher 
for agents with a short-term orientation, relatively soon 
relative preferences become more or less locked and, from 
there on, both ST and LT agents have become long-term 
partners in a stable network. 
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Outperform the Others 
If one accepts cumulative shipments as an acceptable 
proxy for long-term performance for both supplier and 
customer actors, then we find that short-term oriented 
actors tend to outperform the actors focused on long-term 
relations and those that keep a balanced mix. This is 
especially true for the customer side: here the ST actors 
ship 8% more than the average level, and the LT-actors 
11% below average. From the supplier perspective, the 
difference is not so significant: +2% versus –2%. 
Incidentally, Actor 10, the opportunist pur sang in this 
crowd, does best by far as supplier (+10%) and very good 
as a customer (+7%).  
 
Table 2: Cumulative Shipments for Actors across 
Market Segments 
(Categorized by Emphasis on LT versus ST Performance, in % 
of Overall Average) 
 
Orientation   Suppliers  Customers 
Long-term  Actors 1,4,7  1,2,3 
  Score 98%  89% 
Mixed  Actors 2,  5,8  4,5,6 
  Score 96%  100% 
Short-term  Actors 3,6,9  7,8,9 
  Score 102%  108% 
Purely  Actors 10  10 
short-term  Score 110%  107% 
 
4.2.3 Consistent Behavior as Supplier and Customer Is 
Not Required for Short-Term Actors 
Thirty actors in this model operate both as suppliers and 
as customers. These are the 1
st tier suppliers of types A, B 
and C. For these actors, it is interesting to see to what 
degree consistency in behavior in both roles is beneficial 
for performance. What we find here is that consistency is 
not required, neither from the supplier nor from the 
customer perspective.  
From the supplier perspective, Actors 3, 6 and 9 have a 
ST orientation. Of these, Actor 3 is LT-oriented as 
customer, Actor 9 ST-oriented and Actor 6 holds the 
middle. There are no clear differences between their 
performance. If anything, the consistent behavior of Actor 
9 is not rewarded in his supply role, since he scores 1% 
below average, whereas the inconsistently performing 
Actor 3 scores +1%. 
From the customer perspective we look at Actors 7-9. 
Of these, the consistently behaving customer (Actor 9) 
scores –2% versus the average whereas the two other ST-
customers both score +1%. Although these differences are 
not big enough to suggest that inconsistent behavior is 
significantly rewarded, they are even less indicative of a 
positive correlation between consistent behavior in both 
roles and successful performance. 
 
Table 3: Consistent behavior as Supplier and 
Customer is not Beneficial 
(Cumulative shipments for short-term 1
st tier actors in their two 
roles as % of average) 





(ST and ST) 
ST-
Actor 
Actor 9  Actor 9 
  Score 99%  98% 
Somewhat inconsistent 
(ST and MT) 
ST-
Actor 
Actor 6  Actor 8 
  Score 101%  101% 
Inconsistent 
(ST and LT) 
ST-
Actor 
Actor 3  Actor 7 
  Score 100%  101% 
 
5. A Real-World Example 
This research was originally inspired by the real-world 
example of the very successful supply network ASML, a 
manufacturer of state-of-the art lithographic equipment, 
i.e. the machines that manufacture wafers of integrated 
circuits (ICs). ASML has its headquarters located near 
Eindhoven in The Netherlands. The information presented 
in this section is based on publicly available material and 
interviews with company executives responsible for 
developing ASML’s supply network [38,39]. Like the 
OEMs in our simulated network, ASML has always 
produced only some 10% of its end product, so-called 
wafer steppers or wafer scanners, internally. This has been 
so from the onset, and is a remarkable difference with its 
main competitors, Canon and Nikon, who are both 
assumed to be highly vertically integrated.  
The bulk of production is outsourced to broadly 
speaking three types of suppliers: producers of optical 
equipment (lasers, lenses), of mechanical and of electronic 
equipment. The company has some sixty key 1
st tier 
suppliers, but its entire supply network is easily more than 
a tenfold of that. With the bulk of its key suppliers, ASML 
accounts for less than 25% of these companies’ revenue. 
Nevertheless, there are some companies or business units 
of larger companies where the dependency on ASML 
orders is considerably higher. 
As with most high-tech companies, the managerial 
attitude with ASML has been relatively opportunistic, also 
in its behaviour towards its supplier base. Nevertheless, 
there has been a considerable emphasis on developing 
long-term relationships with key suppliers. As a result, 
several if not most of ASML’s key suppliers today are the 
same ones that the company started off with over fifteen 
years ago, which corresponds with the simulation model.  
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this management policy. This trust has been severely 
tested in the past due to the steep ramp-ups and ramp-
downs that characterize the lithography industry, where 
year-over-year changes of over 40% are not uncommon 
(as compared to 37% for the U.S. machine tool industry 
[6]). Suppliers are surprised by sudden decreases in 
ASML’s orders when the IC business cycle turns 
downward and face considerable supply chain difficulties 
as a result. As a result, some suppliers are reluctant to 
trust a steep increase in orders as the business cycle turns 
up again. Despite ASML’s emphasis on long-term 
relationships with suppliers, it is with these skeptical 
suppliers that the company’s level of business decreases 
over time. This is again similar to what we found in our 
simulation model, where preferences changed most 
rapidly in periods of considerable stress on the supply 
network. Also, the three-year business cycle and long-term 
growth rate of around 20% fit with the incoming customer 
order rate in the simulation model for this study.  
6. Discussion 
6.1. Methodological Considerations 
The research reported here is clearly exploratory in 
nature. Most research on decentralized co-ordination 
between multiple agents in general, and in supply chain 
management in particular, is very recent and preliminary. 
This obviously also holds for our research. Exploratory 
research remains an unusual research approach in the field 
of production and operations management. In two 
literature surveys from the early nineties, theory-testing 
research designs were found in 85% of all articles 
published [40,42]. As such, theory-building remains a step 
in the research process which has been lamented as sorely 
missing in production and operations [41,42]. Our 
research here should make a modest and explorative 
contribution to theory-building on decentralized supply 
chain coordination.  
One obvious methodological observation to make is 
that it appears feasible, and even advantageous, to 
implement agent-based models in a system dynamics 
environment. Of course the excellent work of Sterman and 
Wittenberg [43] had given use one instance showing that 
this was possible, but this study is another early 
combinations of these two approaches to modeling 
complex adaptive systems. For the author, the maturity of 
the Vensim language, and hence its advanced 
functionality, ease of use and robustness, contrasted 
starkly to the much more “experimental” nature of the 
specific agent-based modeling environments he has 
encountered.  Moreover, given the complexity of the 
behavior of the supply agents involved, and the well-
developed body of knowledge on representing supply 
agents in system dynamics, the author would have been 
hard-pressed to develop similar functionality in another 
modeling environment or general-purpose language. It is 
feedback perspective which is inherent to system 
dynamics modeling that drives most, if not all, of the 
decisions and actions of actors in these supply networks. 
Another, more fundamental, methodological 
consideration is that this research design employs 
simulation to look for new knowledge, to build new 
theory. This is again unusual. Simulation experiments are 
normally seen as a suitable research design for theory-
testing in operations management [40]: for finding out if a 
theory will work or to what extent it will work if 
experiments in reality are expensive, time-consuming, 
dangerous or impossible [25]. And yet, if a simulation is 
no better than the assumptions built into it, how can it 
generate new knowledge, new theories? A most eloquent 
reply to this valid question has been composed by Herbert 
Simon, who stated some thirty years ago in this context: 
“even when we have correct premises, it may be very 
difficult to discover what they imply. All correct 
reasoning is a grand system of tautologies, but only God 
can make direct use of that fact. The rest of us must 
painstakingly and fallibly tease out the consequences of 
our assumptions.” [44 p.19].  
6.2. Limitations and Links 
There are many obvious limitations to this study. The 
firms simulated here have no real capacity constraints with 
considerable delays in building up (c.f. [45]). Also, there 
are no increases in product functionality or fluctuations in 
production and product quality as might be expected in 
industries that are growing some twenty percent per year.  
Nor is asset specificity [9,36] represented explicitly: all 
suppliers in a market segment are manufacturing the same 
products for all customers from the start and continue to 
be able to do so equally well, regardless of their level of 
involvement in its production. There are no switching 
costs [8,36] ]in moving from one supplier or customer to 
another. Nor do firms perish or are they taken over by 
others, eliminating possibilities for vertical integration, a 
normal business strategy in many industries (c.f. [46]).   
Finally, from an agent-based modeling perspective, the 
agents in this model do not breed, nor is there rule 
discovery  (c.f. [29,47]). One could say that there is some 
form of machine learning taking place, in the sense that 
actors keep adjusting the mental models they hold of their 
opponents (credit assignment, in the terminology of 
Holland [29]), but this learning algorithm is certainly not 
overly sophisticated (c.f. [47]). 
Despite these limitations, it must also be noted that the 
main findings from this research appear to fit well with 
progress made in other studies performed from a 
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theory. Our first main observation, i.e. that preferences 
become locked early on, is consistent with findings from 
complexity theory and economics regarding lock-in and 
path dependence (e.g. [24,26,35,36]. And our second 
main observation, i.e. that an orientation on short-term 
behavior of your partners tends to be beneficial over the 
long term is mirrored in game-theoretical research such as 
the ground-breaking work done by Axelrod on the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma problem [48]. The strongest algorithm 
emerging from that research, TIT FOR TAT, also 
evaluated the performance of other agents solely on their 
recent behavior and adjusted its own recommended course 
of action as well. Nevertheless, this soon led to a 
population of agents all collaborating continuously and 
successfully with each other [48].  
6.3. Managerial Implications 
The rules for how to operate in networks of 
interdependent companies are new and mostly unwritten 
[10]. This study has attempted to generate some tentative 
first attempts at rules for companies operating in such 
environments, to allow for rigorous testing and further 
refinement.  
One such possible managerial guideline is that one 
should not be afraid to insist on consistently good 
performance with suppliers, even when one is already 
having a close relationship with them for a long time.   
Recommendations such as these are also heard from the 
field of business strategy, such as Eisenhardt’s and 
Galunic’s study into co-evolvement [7]. Here these 
researchers found that, in looking for genuine synergies 
between business units, business unit managers should be 
rewarded for their individual, short-term performance, not 
for collaboration for its own sake.  
Another finding from Eisenhardt and Galunic [7] is not 
replicated in the present study. This is their observation 
that managers routinely keep changing their web of 
collaborative links. In this model, such continuous 
changes in network set-up were not found. This may be at 
least partly due to the above-mentioned limitations 
inherent tot the design of the simulation model used. 
Alternatively, it may also be a matter of aggregation level: 
Eisenhardt and Galunic may be talking about different 
links but with the same business partners. Nevertheless, 
one recommendation emerging from this study might be 
that, when looking for new opportunities and resources, it 
may be beneficial to start looking within one’s present 
customer and supplier base.  
7. Conclusions 
This article has described an exploratory study of 
emerging decentralized supply networks. A simulation 
model of one hundred firms operating in a three-echelon 
convergent supply chain was developed in a system 
dynamics simulation language using concepts from agent-
based modeling. Apart from their location in this network, 
agents only differed in the degree in which they base their 
relative preferences for customers and suppliers either 
primarily on their short-term performance towards the 
agent in question, or mainly upon the intensity of long-
term relationships, or on both. 
The main findings from this study are twofold. Firstly, 
that stable supply networks emerge spontaneously as 
relative preferences for specific customers and suppliers 
start diverging. This divergence occurs when the supply 
chain becomes strained for the first time, either by a steep 
ramp-up of production or a rapid fall in orders.  After this 
happens, the relative ranking of these preferences does no 
longer change. 
A second main finding from this research is that, in 
general, it appears advantageous to shift preferences for 
customers and suppliers based primarily on their short-
term performance towards the firm in question, as 
opposed to mainly based upon the intensity of long-term 
relationships. Firms that allocate priorities based on short-
term performance do better than their more long-term 
oriented counterparts. This is especially true for 
opportunistic customers, less so for supplier behavior.  
It appears that emergent supply networks, however fast 
the company they are keeping, are here to stay. This 
article has attempted to illustrate that the same can 
probably be said for the happy marriage between agent-
based modeling and system dynamics as a means for 
understanding how such networks should best be 
coordinated.  
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